Abstract-In a recent conference (ICSSSM 2010), Eun-Jun Yooni and Kee-Young proposed the two-pass elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol EECKE-1N that according to the authors is more efficient that ECKE-1N. In this paper we point out that the protocol proposed by the aforementioned authors is in fact the elliptic curve version of the MTI/C0 family of key agreement protocols which suffer from a well-known vulnerability against a particular type of key-compromise impersonation attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange scheme was published in 1976 [1] , to address the problem of communicating on insecure networks, a large number of key agreement protocols based on this paradigm have been proposed by many researchers (see for example [2] - [10] and Section 12.6 of [11] ).
The output of a DH key exchange protocol is a shared cryptographic key which two parties may use to setup a private and authenticated communication channel. To establish the key, a variety of cryptographic primitives are employed with entity authentication achieved via public key cryptography.
In a recent conference (ICSSSM 2010), Eun-Jun Yooni and Kee-Young proposed the two-pass elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol EECKE-1N [12] which according to the authors has the same security properties of ECKE-1N [13] but is more efficient.
In this paper, we point out that the EECKE-1N protocol is in fact the specification of the MTI/C0 family of protocols on elliptic curves; it is well-known that the MTI/C0 protocol is vulnerable to a particular type of key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack (that we describe in Section 3).
II. REVIEW OF PROTOCOL EECKE-1N
To make this work self-contained we first recall some important mathematical background and then briefly review the EECKE-1N protocol specification (Fig. 1) . where • q is the underlying field order;
• FR (field representation) is an indication of the method used to represent field elements in F q ;
• the seed S is for randomly generated elliptic curves;
• the coefficients a, b ∈ F q define the equation of the elliptic curve E(F q ) over F q ;
• the base point P=(P.x, P.y) of large prime order in E(F q );
• the prime order n of P and the cofactor h=#E(F q )/n (where #E(F q ) denotes the number of points in the curve E(F q )).
The parameters Φ EC should be appropriately chosen so that no efficient algorithms exist that solves the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) or the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) in the subgroup <P>. The point P ∞ denotes the identity point in <P>. The domain parameters must also undergo a validation process proving the elliptic curve has the claimed security attributes [14] .
Capital letters A,B are used to denote principals; their private-public key pairs are, respectively, (w A ,W A ) and (w B ,W B ) with w A randomly chosen in [1, n-1] and W A =w A P. We assume that digital certificates (denoted by cert A , cert B respectively) are issued by mutually trusted Certification Authorities (CA). The map H: F q → {0,1}
l represents a hash function (l > 128).
A:
The actions performed by each peer are the following: 1) A chooses a random nonce r A ∈ R [1,n-1] (the symbol ∈ R denotes the selection of an element at random in a set) and computes Q A =r A W B ; 2) If Q A =P ∞ return to step 1. Otherwise, A sends Q A to B to initiate the key exchange protocol;
3) B invokes a procedure to perform public-key validation of Q A (e.g. to verify that Q A is actually a point in the group E(F q ) and aborts the protocol run if the validation fails. Otherwise, B chooses r B ∈ R [1,n-1], computes Q B =r B W A and sends Q B to A as the response message (B also repeats the last step if Q B =P ∞ ); 4) A performs public-key validation of Q B and aborts the protocol run if the validation fails; 5) A and B compute, respectively, the points T A and T B ; 6) Both A and B terminate holding the session key sk.
Correctness of the protocol follows by observing that, for honest parties A and B, at the end of a protocol run, if the equality T A =T B =hr A r B P holds then both peers will compute the same session key sk.
It is a simple matter to verify that the above protocol scheme is equivalent to the original specification of the MTI/C0 [6] protocol in a cyclic group G of prime order p (with g generator of G), where scalar multiplication correspond to exponentiations; indeed, in this case the keying material would be computed as follows 
III. A KCI ATTACK AGAINST PROTOCOL EECKE-1N
In this section we show that protocol EECKE-1N is vulnerable to KCI attacks. Recall that in a KCI attack the adversary E, having learned A's long-term private, attempts to establish a valid session key with A by masquerading as another legitimate principal (say B).
It is instructive to discuss the implications deriving from the exposure of a private key [15] , for example, the adversary can 1) impersonate A to another principal; 2) impersonate another principal (say B) in a protocol run with A (KCI attack); and 3) attempt to learn the session keys established in earlier runs of the protocol between honest parties.
In case 1) the adversary can convince B to accept a message that was not truly sent by A while, in case 2) she can send messages to A as if they originated from any other principal. In practice, the adversary could impersonate a banking system and cause party A to accept a predetermined session key and then obtain personal data (e.g. a credit card number) over the secure communication link. In case 3) the adversary may be able to decrypt the data exchanged by A and B in previous runs of the protocol (provided the communication transcripts are known).
In Fig. 2 we provide a detailed description of the KCI attack against protocol EECKE-1N (E(B) denotes that E is impersonating B): Both A and E(B) terminate holding the session key sk (see below) and therefore the attack is successful.
It is a trivial matter to prove that T A =T E(B) : T A = hw A -1 r A Q E(B) = hw A -1 r A r E(B) w A W B = hr A r E(B) W B = hr E(B) Q A = T E(B) .
Therefore, whenever A initiates a secure communication with some known party, E can always intercept the first message Q A and subsequently impersonate the peer to A, until the compromise is detected and the long-term key is revoked. 
IV. ON THE SECURITY OF THE EECKE-1N PROTOCOL
In this section we qualitatively evaluate the security of the EECKE-1N (MTI/C0) protocol under the complexity-theoretic model of authenticated key exchange (AKE) described in [9] . In this model (denoted eCK) the adversary is given the ability to ask of any party the following types of queries: 5) Ephemeral Key Reveal, to obtain all session specific information used by the party in a protocol run; 6) Long-Term Key Reveal, which returns all secret information (e.g. long-term private keys) and 7) Reveal, for exposing session keys. Any combination of queries allowing the adversary to trivially break an AKE protocol is not permitted. Test sessions are classified as either "passive" or "active" depending on whether the adversary can (respectively) only observe the communication transcripts exchanged by two honest participants or also modify them. As the result, in passive sessions both parties will possibly complete matching sessions; on the other hand, active sessions are those where matching sessions are not necessarily established.
For passive sessions we allow the adversary to reveal any subset of the four types of secret keys (ephemeral and long-term secrets), held by the two parties, which does not contain both the ephemeral and long-term secret keys of one peer. In other words, simultaneous Ephemeral Key Reveal and Long-Term Key Reveal queries of one party are not allowed in the eCK model since they would trivially allow the adversary to break any AKE protocol. When the adversary is allowed to forge communications between parties, i.e. for active sessions, she can only reveal the long-term secret key or the ephemeral secret key of the party which is executing the test session.
Technically, the protocol is broken in the eCK model if the test session (on which the adversary issues the test query) is clean and the guess query returns 1. A session sid initiated by A (session identifiers are defined as the concatenation of the identities of two peers and the information they exchange during a protocol run) is not clean if any of the following conditions hold: a) A or B is totally controlled by the adversary; b) the adversary issues a query Reveal(sid) or Reveal(sid*) if the later session exists (the session identifier sid* is relative to the peer B); c) session sid* exists and the adversary issues queries Long-Term Key Reveal(A) and Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid) or Long-Term Key Reveal(B) and Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid*); d) session sid* does not exist and the adversary issues query either Reveal(sid*) or both Long-Term Key Reveal(A) and Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid*).
The adversary E runs the AKE experiment by executing the algorithm described in Fig. 2 . E chooses the session initiated by A as the test session and after sending message Q E(B) to A asks the query Long-Term Key Reveal(A); at some stage E queries the random oracle with the same arguments used by the party running the test session (i.e. T A .x, Q A .x, Q E(B) .x, id A , id B ). The attack succeeds because the adversary knows the value of T A and the test session is clean since none of the aforementioned conditions are true.
